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 Abstract
We decompose the change in banks' net interest margin into a change in market-wide
bank rates and a change in the balance-sheet composition. Our empirical ndings from
a detailed data set on German banks' balance-sheet positions, broken down into dierent
maturities, creditors and borrowers and degrees of liquidity are as follows: (i) Changes in
bank rates have a much greater impact on and explain more of the variation in net in-
terest margins than do changes in balance-sheet compositions. (ii) Changes in bank rates
and changes in balance-sheet compositions aect the change in the net interest margin
less strongly for derivative users than for non-users. On average, banks employ interest
rate derivatives to reduce on-balance risk. (iii) When risk-taking becomes more lucrative,
banks tend to increase their on-balance exposure. This eect is more pronounced for
derivative users than for non-users.
Keywords: Net Interest Margin, Banking, Balance-Sheet Composition
JEL classication: G21Non-technical summary
Banks collect deposits and channel these funds to rms for nancing their investment
projects. Thereby, banks transform the cash ows in several ways. Short-term deposits are
used to grant long-term loans (term and liquidity transformation), and the risky returns
from these loans are transformed into risk-free payments to customer deposits (credit
risk transformation). Banks are remunerated for the risk that is accompanied with the
transformations. This remuneration is part of the banks' net interest income.
We investigate how the banks manage their net interest margin, i.e. the net interest
income divided by the bank's total assets. To do so, we break down the timely change
in the net interest margin into three components, namely the component that is due
to changes in the premiums for the dierent transformation functions, the component
that results from changes in the balance-sheet composition and the bank-specic residual
component. For our empirical investigation, we use a data set that is broken down in
detail into maturities, creditors and debtors and degrees of liquidity. The study covers all
universal banks in Germany from 1999 to 2010. We derive the following empirical results:
 Changes in the risk premiums have a much stronger impact on the net interest
margin than changes in the composition of the balance sheet.
 Banks apply derivatives to reduce on-balance interest rate risk. Thereby, however,
their total risk does not decrease as they increase their exposure to other risks
accordingly.
 When risk premiums increase, banks tend to increase their on-balance exposure.
This behavior is more pronounced for banks using derivatives than for banks which
do not.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Banken sammeln die Gelder der Einleger ein und reichen sie an die Unternehmer f ur
deren Investitionen weiter, wobei sie als Mittler die Zahlungsstr ome transformieren. So
werden kurzfristig f allige Kundengelder als langfristige Kredite vergeben (Fristen- und
Liquidit atstransformation), und die unsicheren R uck usse aus diesen Krediten werden
in Zahlungen f ur sichere Kundeneinlagen umgewandelt (Risikotransformation). F ur das
Risiko, das mit diesen Transformationen einhergeht, werden die Banken entlohnt, was sich
im Zins uberschuss der Banken niederschl agt.
In diesem Papier wird untersucht, wie die Banken ihre Nettozinsmarge, d.h. den
Zins uberschuss bezogen auf die Bilanzsumme, steuern. Dazu wird die zeitliche  Anderung
der Nettozinsmarge einer jeden Bank in drei Teile aufgespalten, n amlich in einen Teil, der
auf  Anderungen in den Pr amien f ur die einzelnen Transformationensfunktionen zur uckgeht,
in einen Teil, der sich aus den  Anderungen in der Bilanzzusammensetzung ergibt, und in
einen bankindividuellen Restteil. Wir verwenden f ur diese empirische Unterschung einen
Datensatz, bei dem die Bilanzen der Banken detailliert nach Laufzeiten, Schuldern und
Gl aubigern sowie dem Grad der Liquidit at aufgegliedert sind. Die Studie erstreckt sich
 uber alle Universalbanken in Deutschland und den Zeitraum von 1999 bis 2010. Es ergeben
sich folgende empirische Ergebnisse:
  Anderungen in den Risikopr amien haben einen viel st arkeren Eekt auf die Net-
tozinsmarge als  Anderungen in der Zusammensetzung der Bankenbilanz.
 Banken nutzen Derivate dazu, die Zins anderungsrisiken in der Bilanz abzusichern.
Dadurch sinkt aber nicht das Gesamtrisiko der Banken, weil sie die  ubrigen Risikopo-
sitionen entsprechend erh ohen.
 Steigen die Risikopr amien, dann weiten die Banken tendenziell ihre Risikopositionen
aus. Dieses Verhalten ist bei Banken, die Derivate einsetzen, st arker ausgepr agt als
bei Banken, die keine Derivate einsetzen.Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Managing the net interest margin 3
2.1 Price and weight changes without derivatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Usage of derivatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3 Data 7
3.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2 Bank rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4 Results 11
4.1 Relative importance of price and weight changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2 Usage of derivatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3 Changes in on-balance exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5 Conclusion 16Banks' management of the net interest margin:
Evidence from Germany1
1 Introduction
Banks provide three main transformation functions with which they generate income,
namely term, liquidity and risk transformations. With these transformation functions,
banks fulll an important role for economic prosperity; the income generated with these
transformation functions, or more precisely banks' net interest margin, determines the
social costs of nancial intermediation (Maudos and de Guevara (2004)). Research on
banks' interest margins, dened as the dierence between interest revenues and expenses
per unit of assets, has a long tradition and has identied key determinants explaining
dierences in the level of interest margins (Ho and Saunders (1981), Angbazo (1997),
Wong (1997), Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Maudos and de Guevara (2004), Kasman
et al. (2010)).
While research has so far focused on explaining the level of banks' interest margin,
we put forward a decomposition of the change in the net interest margin that allows us
to investigate banks' management of the net interest margin. We decompose the change
in the net interest margin into three components: The rst component, which we call
price change, captures how changes in market-wide bank rates for various assets and
liabilities contribute to the change in the net interest margin. These price changes include
all changes in premiums for banks' transformation functions, i.e. market-wide changes in
the premiums for term, liquidity and risk transformation that give compensation to banks
for interest rate, liquidity and credit risk. The second component, which we call weight
change, captures how changes in the banks' balance-sheet structure, i.e. the changes in the
on-balance risk exposure, contribute to the overall change in the net interest margin. The
third component is the idiosyncratic change in a bank's net interest margin and captures
bank-specic deviations from the market-wide bank rates.
In the short run, a bank's management can inuence the net interest margin by adjust-
ing the balance-sheet weights. In this sense, weight changes are endogenous. By contrast,
1The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect the opinions
of the Deutsche Bundesbank. We thank the participants of the Bundesbank Research Seminar for their
helpful comments.
1changes in the net interest margin that are due to market-wide changes in bank rates are
exogenous, at least in the short run. In the long run, however, the management decides
on the bank's exposure to the dierent types of risk. In other words, the component due
to price changes reects the management's strategic attitude towards risk-taking whereas
the component due to weight changes is about tactical decisions.
In our empirical study, we use annual data from all German universal banks from
1999 to 2010 and estimate 18 market-wide bank rates (8 related to assets and 10 related
to liabilities) to capture rates on various maturities, dierent types of borrowers and
creditors, and dierent degrees of liquidity. We use the estimated market-wide bank rates
to calculate price and weight changes. Then, we investigate the relevance of these price
and weight changes for the changes in net interest margins. We nd that price changes,
i.e. the strategic component, have a far stronger impact on and explain a greater deal
of the variation in net interest margins than weight changes, which represent the tactical
component.
Derivatives are an important instrument of managing risk. Several decades ago, the
interest rate, liquidity and credit risks were closely associated with the asset-liability struc-
ture of the banks' balance sheet. Therefore, the main way in which banks limited their
exposure to interest rate, liquidity and credit risk was by constraining their asset-liability
structure which created a strong dependence between investment (granting loans) and
nancing decisions (collecting deposits or issuing additional equity). Nowadays, however,
risk-transfer instruments, such as interest rate and currency swaps, allow banks to sepa-
rate their on-balance sheet asset-liability structure from the risk exposure implied by it
(e.g. Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot et al. (1993)). Therefore, we investigate dierences
between derivative users and non-users and nd that price and weight changes aect the
change in the net interest margin less strongly when banks apply derivatives than when
they do not. This evidence indicates that banks use derivatives to reduce the on-balance
interest rate risk exposure.
We also investigate banks' weight changes, which summarize { for each bank and
each year { all changes in the balance-sheet structure into a single number. Here we
investigate the correlation between weight changes and price changes and discuss whether
this correlation diers between banks using derivatives and those which do not. Our
empirical ndings indicate that weight changes of banks using derivatives depend more
2strongly on price changes than the ones of non-users. Banks using derivatives increase their
on-balance exposure to those risk factors whose remuneration increases more strongly than
banks not using derivatives.
Analyzing weight and price changes is a promising and innovative alternative to mea-
sures used so far in the literature. One strand of the literature has analyzed maturity
gaps dened as the dierence between assets and liabilities that mature or are repriced
within a particular time frame, such as one year (Ahmed et al. (1997), Purnanandam
(2007)). By contrast, our measure takes into account dierent dimensions of on-balance
risk-taking, including maturity and liquidity mismatches, and exposure to credit risk.
Moreover, our approach is advantageous since we distinguish between prices for risks and
quantities of risks. For instance, the interest margin does not only depend on the degree of
term transformation but also on the price a bank earns per unit of term transformation.
Another strand of the literature has measured asset-liability dependencies with various
correlation techniques (DeYoung and Yom (2008), Memmel and Schertler (2011)). For
instance, using canonical correlation analyses on data from U.S. commercial banks, DeY-
oung and Yom (2008) nd evidence that risk-transfer instruments have allowed banks to
reduce their on-balance sheet asset-liability dependencies. While correlation measures do
not deliver insights into the asset-liability structure of single banks, our measure has the
strong advantage that it oers weight and price changes for each single bank in each single
year.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the decompo-
sition of the change in the net interest margin into price and weight changes and puts
forward testable statements about its management. Section 3 describes the data, deliv-
ers estimates for 18 market-wide bank rates for dierent asset and liability positions, and
summarizes price and weight changes for the German banking industry. Section 4 presents
our ndings on how changes in the net interest margin and the sensitivity between weight
and price changes dier between banks using derivatives and those which do not. Section 5
concludes.
2 Managing the net interest margin
We decompose the change in the net interest margin of a bank not using derivatives into
a price change, which is beyond the control of bank managers, and a weight change,
3which captures managers' tactical adjustments of the balance sheet. Then, we discuss the
dierences between derivative users and non-users.
2.1 Price and weight changes without derivatives
The net interest income NM (in euro) of a bank not using derivatives is the dierence of
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We use Equation (3) to decompose the change in the bank's net interest margin as
follows:
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(6)
PCH is the dierence between the margin today and last year under the assumption
that the last year's balance-sheet structure prevails and that the bank's idiosyncratic eect
4is unchanged. Thus, PCH gives the change in a bank's net interest margin due to changes
in market-wide bank rates. An increase in the premiums for term, liquidity and credit risk
transformation due to a change in average rates rj;t, which we capture by a price change
PCH, increases banks' net interest margins. Hence, we look at the combination of dierent
exposures, namely interest rate, liquidity and credit risk exposure. The price change is,
to a very large extent, beyond the bank management's inuence, since it refers to changes
in market prices. For example, when the slope of the term structure increases (which is
exogenous from the bank management's perspective), the net interest margin goes up even
if the management decides not to take on additional interest rate risk. Having said this,
the bank management took the strategic decision in the past to be exposed to interest
rate risk, or alternatively stated the bank's business model relies on the return from term
transformation.
Correspondingly, WCH is the dierence between the margin today and last year under
the assumption that the bank rates are xed to the ones today and that the bank's
idiosyncratic eect is unchanged. Thus, WCH shows the eects in a bank's net interest
margin due to changes in the balance-sheet structure. Bank managers inuence their net
interest margins by tactically changing their balance-sheet structure, captured by a weight
change WCH. An increase in the exposure increases a bank's net interest margin, even if
the average rates remain constant.
Per construction, these two variables are correlated with the change in the net interest
margin. However, whether price or weight changes have a higher relevance in explaining
changes in the net interest margin is an empirical question. To gain insight into the relative
importance of price and weight changes, we compare the coecient of determination (R2)
of dierent specications of the following equation:
nmi;t = 0 + 1  PCHi;t + 2  WCHi;t + "i;t (7)
This equation can be interpreted as the empirical equivalent to (4).
2.2 Usage of derivatives
Recent literature has put forward several explanations as to why and when hedging is
worth considering, such as risk aversion of managers (Stulz (1984)), tax considerations
(Smith and Stulz (1985)), and capital market imperfections leading to costs of nancial
5distress and inecient investment decisions (e.g. Stulz (1990), Froot et al. (1993)). We do
not investigate dierent explanations for using derivatives. Rather, we build our argument
on the exibility implied by the use of derivatives: The use of derivatives, namely interest
rate swaps, allows banks to separate the exposure to dierent sources of risk. For instance,
assume that there is demand for long-term loans and the bank wants to hold the credit
risk but notes the interest rate risk. A bank using derivatives can grant this loan and
can oset the interest rate risk with an interest rate swap. By contrast, a bank not using
derivatives has to renounce to grant this loan. If not, it has to bear the unwanted interest
rate risk associated with the long-term loan, or it has to oset the interest rate risk via
appropriate interbank positions. Irrespective of the action chosen, the bank not using
derivatives cannot achieve the outcome of the bank using derivatives. However, because
the use of derivatives comes at a cost, mainly x costs, it is not prot-maximizing for all
banks.
As traditional banking business (granting long-term loans and collecting short-term
deposits) is much associated with term transformation, hedging interest rate risk would
make additional on-balance business possible. If derivatives are mainly applied to reduce
on-balance interest rate risk, the change in derivative users' net interest margin reacts less
strongly to changes in prices and weights than the one of non-users. We empirically check
this with the following regression:
nmi;t = 0+1PCHi;t+2PCHi;tDERi;t+3WCHi;t+4WCHi;tDERi;t+"i;t: (8)
where DER denotes a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 in case of a bank using
derivatives, and 0 otherwise. If derivatives are used to hedge, the coecients 2 and 4
should be negative.
An increase in the remuneration for risk-taking gives the bank management incentives
to increase the intensity of term, liquidity and credit risk transformation. For instance,
when the term structure of interest rates becomes steeper, i.e. term transformation is
better remunerated, banks tend to increase their interest rate risk exposure. In qualitative
terms, it is the same prot-maximizing behavior that makes a rm in the real sector
expand its production when the product price increases. Therefore, we expect a positive
correlation between risk remuneration captured by price changes (PCH) and exposure
captured by weight changes (WCH). Thus, changes in the net interest margin due to
6price changes are associated with changes in the net interest margin due to changes in the
balance-sheet composition (with prices remaining constant).
The use of derivative is likely to inuence the correlation between price changes and
weight changes. On the one hand, one may argue that banks using interest rate derivatives
adjust their interest rate exposure with derivatives so that they do no or little on-balance
sheet adjustment after changes in the steepness of the term structure. Then, the correlation
between price and weight changes should be less pronounced for derivative users than for
non-users. On the other hand, banks with derivatives may react more strongly to changes
in premiums, because using derivatives allows them to assume the exact exposure they
want separately for each type of risk. For instance, assume that the premium for credit
risk goes up and the term structure becomes less steep. A bank without derivatives,
is likely to leave the positions unchanged or to do very little adjustment because the
two developments tend to cancel each other out. By contrast, a bank using derivatives
can increase its exposure to credit risk and { at the same time { decrease its exposure
to interest rate risk by employing derivatives. Then, the correlation between price and
weight changes should be more pronounced for derivative users than for non-users.
We investigate whether the correlation between price and weight changes diers be-
tween derivative users and non-users by running the following regression:
WCHi;t = 0 + 1  DERi;t + 2  PCHi;t + 3  DERi;t  PCHi;t + "i;t (9)
3 Data
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Our sample comprises German universal banks, i.e. private commercial banks, savings
banks and cooperative banks. The period under consideration covers 12 years, from 1999
to 2010. The number of banks in our sample varies between 2,577 in 1999 and 1,395 in
2010 mainly due to mergers and acquisitions. In total, our sample has 22,239 bank-year
observations (see Table 1). We start our analyses in 1999 because there was a major
change in the reporting forms, when the euro was introduced, especially concerning the
maturity brackets.
To distinguish between banks using derivatives and those which do not we rely on
notional amounts of derivatives stated in the monthly balance-sheet statistics. We specify
7that a bank uses derivatives if the notional amount is strictly positive; a bank does not
use derivatives if the notional amount is zero in a given year. These derivatives include
interest rate swaps, currency swaps, and combined interest rate and currency swaps, where
pure interest rate swaps account by far for most of the notional volume.
Table 1 gives the percentage of banks using derivatives, which has substantially and
steadily increased during the period from 1999 to 2010. In 1999, less than 29% of the
German banks used interest rate derivatives, while in 2010 this percentage increased to
nearly 48%. Moreover, we observe a distinct size eect: On average, less than 10% of the
banks in the lowest size quartile use interest rate derivatives, whereas more than 65% of
the banks in the highest size quartile make use of these instruments.
To obtain the banks' balance-sheet structure, we use data from the Deutsche Bundes-
bank's monthly balance-sheet statistics (see, Memmel and Stein (2008)). Table 2 shows
how the balance sheet is broken down into dierent types of borrowers and creditors (e.g.
banks versus non-banks), into dierent maturities (e.g. short-term versus long-term) and
dierent degrees of liquidity (e.g. customer deposits versus issued bonds). In total, we
distinguish 8 asset and 10 liability positions. Note that the reporting forms are much
more detailed. However, to avoid a large number of banks having positions with zero
weights, we do not use the maximal disaggregation, but merge positions where necessary
and appropriate. Asset positions not considered in our analyses are, for instance, real
estate, shareholdings in associated companies and other equity instruments since they do
not yield any interest revenues. On the liability side, we exclude the banks' capital and
provisions since they do not lead to interest expenses.
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics for selected asset and liability positions that
are most relevant in terms of total assets for banks with and without derivatives.2 The
balance-sheet structure indicates the dominance of commercial banking activities. This is
not surprising since savings and cooperative banks, which dominate the number of banks
in our sample, are strongly engaged in traditional commercial banking. Loans to customers
2Except for the year 1999, for which we use year-end balance-sheet weights, we apply the average of the
current and previous year-end balance-sheet weights to have an estimate for the average annual balance-
sheet weight. This procedure is especially important for positions with short maturity because their book
values change substantially from one year to the next. Positions with medium or long maturity do not
change substantially from one year to the next.
8account for more than 61% of total assets of the median bank. Also, customer deposits
(more than 37%) and savings accounts (31% and 34% for median banks with and without
derivatives) are the most important liability positions. For the median bank, both the 8
asset positions and the 10 liability positions account for around 90% of the total assets.
Derivative users' balance-sheet structures do not dier substantially from the one of non-
users. We merely observe that derivative users' savings accounts are less important, while
their issued bonds are more important than those of non-users.
Banks using derivatives have lower interest margins (Table 4), but they have higher
annual changes in the net interest margin than non-users. Banks using derivatives have
lower interest revenues, but similar expenses, on average, than banks not using derivatives.
The timely uctuation of the net interest margin for derivative users is slightly higher than
the one of non-users (0.49% vs. 0.46%), while the standard deviation of changes in the net
interest margin is almost the same for derivative users and non-users (0.21% vs. 0.22%).
Noteworthy, in our sample, the usage of derivatives does not imply that a bank's on-balance
risk exposure goes down.
The sample we use in our empirical analyses is controlled for mergers and acquisitions
and outliers. Since the recent years have been characterized by a large number of mergers
and acquisitions, especially among savings and cooperative banks, we assign a new iden-
tier to banks after a merger or acquisition. We apply a moderate correction of outliers.
We drop those balance-sheet weights which are more than ve standard deviations above
the mean. In addition, we cut o the 1st and 99th percentile of the margin of interest
revenues and interest expenses, respectively.
3.2 Bank rates
We determine market-wide bank rates for the various asset and liability positions by
estimating the empirical equivalent of Equation (3) for interest revenues and expenses
separately, because it was revealed that this would make the estimated rates consider-
ably more reliable. In the estimations, we only include observations of banks not using
derivatives. The expectation of i in Equation (3) need not be zero even if the interest
rates rj correspond to the cross-sectional expectations, i.e. rj = E(ri;j). Due to possible
correlations between a balance-sheet weight wi;j and the bank-individual interest rate ri;j,
the term wi;j (ri;j   rj) may have an expectation which is not equal to zero. Therefore, we
9include a constant and bank-specic xed eects and estimate the interest rates for each
year and each asset and liability position in xed eects regressions.
The estimation results for the various market-wide bank rates are displayed in Table
5. Since we estimate 12 interest rates for the 8 asset positions (a total of 96 coecients),
and 12 interest rates for the 10 liability positions (a total of 120 coecients), we report
the time-series averages of the 8 asset and 10 liability positions. Accordingly, we report
the average standard errors of the estimated coecients. The precision of our interest rate
estimates diers across the positions. For instance, the average standard deviation of the
rate on interbank liabilities with an initial maturity of one to two years is 1.13%, whereas
the precision of the rate on long-term loans to non-banks is more than ten times higher
with the average standard deviation being 0.09%.
In Figure 1, we compare our rate estimates for savings accounts with the respective
rates from the German part of the EWU interest rate statistics available from 2003 to 2010
to gain insights into the reliability of our market-wide bank rate estimates. Although the
level is dierent { the German part of EWU interest rate statistics shows higher values {
the qualitative course in time is quite similar. When the former Bundesbank interest rate
statistics was adapted to the EWU interest rate statistics in 2003, the same observation
was made: During a transition period of six month (during which data was reported
according to the old and new method), it was observed that the level diered but that the
timely movements were qualitatively the same (see Deutsche Bundesbank (2004)).
We use the interest rate estimates ^ r1;t;:::; ^ rJ;t to calculate changes due to prices and
weights according to Equations (5) and (6) and present descriptive statistics in Table 6.
The average price change (PCH) is negative, whereas the average weight change (WCH)
is positive. This means that during the period from 1999 to 2010 the weighted premium
for interest rate, liquidity and credit risk has decreased, while the exposure of the banks
has increased. The standard deviation of the net interest margin changes due to prices
changes is larger for derivative users than for non-users, indicating that the on-balance
exposure of banks using derivatives is larger than that of non-users. When we look at
dierent size quartiles, we nd that this is especially true for large banks. We do not
observe this pattern in the standard deviation of changes in the net interest margin due
to weight changes.
104 Results
4.1 Relative importance of price and weight changes
We estimate Equation (7) to determine the relative importance of price changes (PCH)
and weight changes (WCH) for changes in the net interest margin. In Table 7 we display
the results of ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. In column 1, we include the changes
in prices and weights. The coecients on price changes (0.836) and weight changes (0.475)
are highly signicantly positive, but considerably below 1, which is the theoretical value
laid down in Equation (4). This holds especially for the coecient on weight changes.
Part of this may be due to the usage of derivatives, which we will deal with below, other
causes may be that the (assumed) exogenous variables and the error term are correlated.
For instance, when a bank increases its exposure to, let's say, customer loans, then it
has to oer lower rates to the customers to attract more business, i.e. the increase in
business volume goes at the expense of the margin. Such a negative correlation between
the explanatory variable and the error term leads to a downward biased coecient.
Noteworthy of the price and weight changes is that they account for 41.8% of the vari-
ation in the changes of the net interest margin (see column 1). The rest of the variation
is due to idiosyncratic changes in the bank rates and due to (little) model errors. For
instance, the balance-sheet weights are calculated as the average of the previous year-
end and the current year-end weights, which may be an imprecise estimate for overnight
interbank assets and liabilities. The high coecient of determination R2 in our model
indicates that information about the balance-sheet structure is worth analyzing and suit-
able for predicting interest income. In fact, the explained variance of 41.8% in our model
compares with 28.4% in a recent study using a dierent approach for German savings and
cooperative banks (Memmel (2008)). In columns 2 and 3, we separately report the eect
of price and weight changes, respectively. We nd that price changes alone explain roughly
one third of the variation in the data, while weight changes explain almost 10% of the
variation. In Section 2, we associate the price changes with the strategic component and
the weight changes with the tactical component. It turns out that the strategic component
is about three times as relevant as the tactical component when it comes to changes in
the net interest margin.
114.2 Usage of derivatives
To check whether derivatives (here: mostly interest rate swaps) are applied to reduce on-
balance interest rate exposure, we include interaction terms of a dummy variable equal to
one when the bank uses derivatives, on the one hand, and price and weight changes on
the other. We report results in Table 8. In column 1, the results suggest that derivatives
users' change in the net interest margins responds dierently to price and weight changes
than that of non-users. An increase of 100 basis points due to price changes (weight
changes) translates into an actual margin increase of 89 (51) basis points for banks not
using interest derivatives and of only 76 (42) basis points for derivative users, and these
dierences are highly signicant. These ndings indicate that derivative positions partly
oset the on-balance exposure. Remember, however, that the usage of derivatives does not
imply that a bank's overall on-balance risk exposure goes down (see Table 4). Thus, banks
using derivatives reduce the on-balance exposure to interest rate risk and { simultaneously
{ increase the on-balance exposure to other risk factors so that the overall risk (measured
by the standard deviation of the net interest margin) remains unchanged. The nding
that banks use derivatives for hedging purposes is in line with the recent literature. For
instance, from a sample of 55 US banks Ahmed et al. (1997) nd that after accounting
for their derivatives 33 of them (60%) have a lower interest rate exposure than before.
For U.S. banks, Brewer et al. (2011) show that the loan growth of derivative users is less
restricted by internal funds (core deposits growth) than that of non-users.
Recent literature has shown that bank size and derivatives usage are highly correlated
(e.g. Purnanandam (2007), and this is conrmed in our data as displayed in Table 1);
one reason for this might be the costs for starting the use of derivatives in the form of
trained employees and eective control mechanisms (e.g. Carter and Sinkey (1998)). We
therefore split our sample into four size quartiles and estimate for each quartile how price
and weight changes shape changes in the net interest margin. We display the results in
columns 2 to 5 of Table 8. The coecients on the price change are signicant and of
similar magnitude for all four size quartiles. Derivatives usage decreases the sensitivity
of the net interest margin to price changes only for larger banks (in the 3rd and 4th size
quartile), but not for smaller banks (in the 1st and 2nd size quartile). The coecients on
the weight change are signicant for all size quartiles; their magnitudes are only similar for
the rst three size quartiles. Derivatives usage decreases the sensitivity of the net interest
12margin to weight changes especially for small banks (1st size quartile), which cannot be
found in the case of large banks (in the 4th size quartile). These ndings might indicate
that larger banks, but not smaller ones, use derivatives as a strategic instrument to reduce
on-balance interest rate exposure. By contrast, the net interest margin of small derivative
users is as much exposed to price changes as the one of small non-users, while the net
interest margin of small users is much less exposed to weight changes than that of small
non-users. It seems as if small banks use derivatives to hedge quickly built up on-balance
sheet positions. For instance, when a small bank grants a large loan to a rm, it may use
derivatives to hedge this loan's interest rate risk.
We also employ the notional amount of derivatives relative to total assets to capture
the extent of derivatives use. We run the model presented in column 1 of Table 7 for
ve subsamples according to the extent of derivatives use and present results in Table 9.
We nd that the coecients on price and weight changes decline the larger the extent
of derivatives usage. For non-users, an increase of 100 basis points due to price changes
(weight changes) translates into an actual margin increase of 89 (51) basis points. For users
in the highest derivative quartile, however, an increase of 100 basis points due to price
changes (weight changes) translates into an actual margin increase of only 63 (33) basis
points. Thus, extensive use of derivatives allows banks to reduce the eect of on-balance
price (weight) changes by 29% (35%). In addition, the extensive use of derivatives weakens
the link between the (theoretical) on-balance net interest margin and the actual margin
of the prots & losses statement, observable at diminishing coecients of determination
in Table 9.
We carry out three robustness tests for the model displayed in column 1 of Table 8,
which are available upon request. First, we estimated the model for the dierent banking
groups since the groups dier with respect to ownership structures and business objectives
(Memmel and Schertler (2011)). For savings and cooperative banks we see our ndings
conrmed. Savings banks' changes in the net interest margin respond to price changes
more strongly than the one of cooperative banks. Also, the changes in the net interest
margin of savings banks using derivatives respond to price changes less strongly than that
of cooperative banks using derivatives. Second, we performed subsample regressions for
each year in order to investigate whether the relation between price and weight changes,
on the one hand, and the change in the net interest margin, on the other, changed over
time. Price and weight changes have positive and signicant coecients each year; the
13interaction terms of price (weight) changes and derivatives usage are signicantly negative
in 8 (7) out of the 11 years. Thus, our ndings have not been fully conrmed in these
few years. Third, banks' decision on whether or not to use derivatives may depend on
the (change) in the net interest margin (e.g. Carter and Sinkey (1998), Ashraf et al.
(2011)). Therefore, we instrument the derivative dummy variable with log assets and
non-performing loans. The coecients on the interaction terms are also signicant and of
similar magnitude when these instruments are used.
4.3 Changes in on-balance exposure
Next, we investigate whether banks' behavior is procyclical and whether the procyclicality
is more pronounced for banks using derivatives. Therefore, we investigate the correlation
between weight changes, the banks' tactical adjustments, and price changes, the change
in market-wide bank rates. We estimate Equation (9) and also include a dummy variable
HEK, which is 1 when a bank's regulatory capital ratio is above the median capital
ratio in a given year, and 0 otherwise. We do this to take into account that weight
changes are likely to depend on other banks' characteristics which are also used in studies
analyzing the impact of derivatives use on lending, risky assets and maturity gaps (e.g.
Brewer et al. (2001), Brewer et al. (2000), Brewer et al. (2011), Delis and Kouretas (2011),
Purnanandam (2007), Ahmed et al. (1997)).
We display the results in Table 10. Indeed, we nd that banks react procyclically,
i.e. that an increase in the remuneration for risk-taking is followed by an extension of the
exposure. When the net interest margin goes up by 100 basis points due to price changes,
the exposure increases so that the margin goes up by an additional 4 basis points. This
result is line with Memmel (2011) who nds that a bank's exposure to interest rate risk
is positively related to the steepness of the term structure. Interestingly, banks using
derivatives react more strongly to price changes than non-users (9 basis points vs. 4 basis
points). This nding suggests that banks using derivatives are more exible and, thereby,
just increase the exposure to the risk whose remuneration has gone up, whereas non-users
have to attract new businesses whose interest rate, liquidity, and credit risk matches their
desired risk prole. The subsample estimations for size quartiles presented in columns 2
to 5 show that this eect is caused by large banks. For an increase of 100 basis points due
to a price change, large users increase their weights so that the margin goes up by 14.3
14basis points, while large non-users' margin goes only up by 5.2 basis points. In line with
the ndings in the literature on lending, the exposure increases when the bank belongs to
the better capitalized half of banks.3
As in the last subsection, we also investigate the extent of derivatives use and carry
out robustness checks (available upon request). We split derivative users in 4 subsamples
and run the model depicted in column 1 in Table 10 without the derivative dummy. We
nd that the sensitivity between weight changes and price changes increases the greater
the extent of derivatives usage. Moreover, we estimate the model presented in column 1
of Table 10 for the dierent banking groups. We nd most of our ndings conrmed for
savings and cooperative banks. The only exception is the dummy variable for derivative
users for cooperative banks, which is insignicant.
So far, we only tested whether banks using derivatives dier from non-users with
respect to the sensitivity between weight and price changes. In the following, we focus
on derivative users only and investigate whether they adjust their balance-sheet structure
and their nominal amounts of derivatives at the same time. Therefore, we use a 2-equation
system to model weight changes and derivatives changes simultaneously. Weight changes
are dened as before; derivatives changes denote annual changes in the notional amount
of derivatives relative to total assets. As exogenous variables we include price changes,
HEK, and non-performing loans (NPL). As identifying variables we use assets growth and
the logarithm of total assets. We depict the results in Table 11.
In column 1 we include all banks using derivatives irrespective of their size. Changes in
the derivatives positively inuence weight changes, and weight changes positively inuence
derivatives changes. This indicates that both changes are simultaneously determined.
Price changes aect weight changes positively, and derivatives changes negatively. Thus,
when the renumeration of risk increases, banks reduce their notional amount of derivatives
usage. This behavior is in line with the aim to protect cash ows from dropping. HEK
is not related to weight changes indicating that the positive eect of HEK in Table 10
is due to the inclusion of both banks with and without derivatives. Belonging to the
group of banks with high capitalization comes along with lower derivatives changes. Non-
performing loans inuence weight changes negatively, and derivatives changes positively.
3Note that the explained fraction of variation in weight change regressions is very low.
15This nding may indicate that banks aim at reducing their overall risk exposure when
non-performing loans, i.e. credit risk, increase.
In columns 2 to 4 we report results for size quartiles based on our previous size clas-
sication. Since the number of observations in the 1st quartile is very low, we combine
these observations with the ones from the 2nd quartile. Once we distinguish between
derivative users of dierent sizes, the derivatives changes do not longer inuence weight
changes, while weight changes inuence derivatives changes in a signicantly positive man-
ner. These ndings suggest that changes in the notional amount of derivatives follow
weight changes, but not the other way around. Price changes are signicantly related to
weight changes exclusively in the case of large banks and they are related to derivatives
changes in a signicantly negative way for the larger banks in the 3rd and 4th quartiles.
The results presented in Table 11 are, however, subject to at least two limitations. (i)
The annual change in notional amounts may incorrectly reect hedging intensities applied
by banks. The reason for this is that some of the derivatives may oset other derivatives
of a bank and this is not captured by the notional amounts. (ii) The frequency of our
data, which is annual, may be of too poor a quality to investigate whether changes in
derivatives follow or lead changes in the balance-sheet compositions. When interpreting
the results presented in Table 11 these two limitations have to be kept in mind.
5 Conclusion
We decompose changes in the net interest margin into price and weight changes. Price
changes are the sum of annual changes in market-wide bank rates on dierent assets and
liabilities weighted with the respective asset and liability positions in the previous year.
In the short run, these price changes cannot be inuenced by the management and are
interpreted as the bank managers' strategic decision. Weight changes are the sum of the
current market-wide bank rates on the dierent assets and liabilities weighted with the
annual changes in the banks' balance sheet positions. These weight changes reect bank
managers' tactical decisions. We distinguish and estimate market-wide bank rates for 8
asset and 10 liability positions which dier with respect to the type of borrowers and
lenders, maturities and degrees of liquidity. Therefore, price changes cover all margin-
relevant market-wide changes, such as premium changes due to term structure changes,
liquidity changes, and credit quality changes.
16Our main ndings from a data set of German banks (including private commercial
banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks) for the period from 1999 to 2010 can be
summarized as follows: The price and weight changes explain more than 40% of the
variation in banks' changes in the net interest margin, where price changes are far more
relevant than weight changes. Changes in the net interest margin of banks using derivatives
depend on weight and price changes less strongly than the ones of non-users. This nding
is in line with the argument that interest rate derivatives are mainly used to reduce the
risk of on-balance exposure, or alternatively to give exibility to increase on-balance risk
exposure. Finally, banks behave procyclical, i.e. weight and price changes are positively
correlated; the correlation between weight and price changes is stronger for banks using
derivatives than for banks not using derivatives.
Our research also indicates avenues for future research. Our approach makes it possible
to investigate the banks' management of the net interest margin by using detailed infor-
mation on a bank's balance-sheet composition, thereby taking into account the dierent
market-wide bank rates which depend on dierent creditors and borrowers, maturities and
various degrees of liquidity. This approach may be useful for top-down stress-test exercises
when the net interest income needs to be calculated in dierent scenarios.
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Figure 1: Rate comparison
Note: This gure compares our rate estimates for savings accounts (line with small squares) with the rates from the
EWU interest rate statistics, German contribution, (line with big squares), available for 2003-2010.
21No of bank- Derivative Size quartiles
year obs. users 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1999 2,577 28.8% 8.5% 22.4% 35.4% 48.9%
2000 2,317 30.6% 8.1% 23.5% 40.1% 50.8%
2001 2,138 31.2% 6.5% 24.2% 41.9% 52.4%
2002 1,992 32.2% 8.2% 23.5% 40.2% 56.8%
2003 1,876 33.2% 7.9% 25.8% 40.5% 58.4%
2004 1,807 35.3% 9.3% 28.3% 42.0% 61.4%
2005 1,735 36.5% 9.2% 29.0% 40.6% 67.2%
2006 1,688 41.9% 10.2% 36.5% 49.1% 71.8%
2007 1,659 44.8% 11.1% 38.1% 54.2% 75.8%
2008 1,619 45.2% 10.6% 38.5% 55.1% 76.5%
2009 1,436 44.8% 12.0% 34.3% 53.5% 79.7%
2010 1,395 47.8% 17.5% 37.5% 56.2% 80.2%
Total 22,239 36.6% 9.1% 28.4% 43.8% 65.1%
Table 1: Usage of derivatives
Note: The percentage of banks using derivatives is shown for our sample period 1999-2010. Derivatives are interest
rate swaps, currency swaps, and combined interest rate and currency swaps. Size quartiles are with respect to total
assets in the respective year.
Maturity bracket
1 2 3 4
Loans to banks Daily Up to 1 y 1 y to 5 y More than 5 y
Loans to non-banks { Up to 1 y 1 y to 5 y More than 5 y
Bonds No breakdown
Loans from banks Daily Up to 1 y 1 y to 2 y More than 2 y
Customer deposits Daily Up to 1 y 1 y to 2 y More than 2 y
Savings accounts No breakdown
Issued bonds No breakdown
Table 2: Breakdown of the balance sheet
Note: The balance sheet is broken down according to the type of borrower and creditor, maturity and degree of
liquidity. Maturity refers to initial maturities.
22Banks w/o derivatives Banks with derivatives
25th 50th 75th 25th 50th 75th
Percentile Percentile
Loans to banks 6.4% 10.6% 16.0% 5.9% 9.7% 14.3%
Loans to non-banks 53.6% 61.7% 68.2% 53.4% 61.1% 67.6%
Bonds 11.5% 16.9% 23.7% 11.5% 16.6% 23.0%
Assets included 88.7% 92.1% 93.9% 85.6% 89.9% 92.5%
Loans from banks 9.3% 13.8% 19.2% 10.5% 14.6% 19.8%
Customer deposits 31.0% 37.2% 44.3% 32.1% 37.9% 44.5%
Savings accounts 28.2% 34.4% 40.4% 24.6% 30.8% 36.9%
Issued bonds 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 0.4% 3.1% 6.3%
Liabilities included 88.2% 89.8% 91.2% 88.3% 89.6% 90.9%
Table 3: Selected balance-sheet positions
Note: The most relevant balance-sheet positions in terms of total assets are shown for banks with and without
derivatives. Overall, we distinguish 8 asset and 10 liability positions (see Table 2). Assets included and Liabilities
included refer to the sum of these positions. All German universal banks are included from 1999 to 2010.
Banks w/o derivatives Banks with derivatives
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
Interest revenues 4.96% 0.64% 4.72% 0.65%
Interest expenses 2.50% 0.55% 2.54% 0.55%
Net interest margin 2.46% 0.46% 2.18% 0.49%
Change in net margin income -0.03% 0.22% -0.02% 0.21%
Table 4: Interest margin
Note: Interest revenues, interest expenses, and the net interest margin are depicted as a percentage of total assets.
All German universal banks are included from 1999 to 2010.
23Interest revenue Interest expenses
Position Bracket Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
Loans to/from banks 1 2.21% 0.19% 1.37% 0.55%
2 2.43% 0.16% 0.99% 0.30%
3 3.30% 0.19% 2.34% 1.15%
4 4.30% 0.28% 3.33% 0.15%
Loans to/from non-banks 1 0.37% 0.16%
2 5.88% 0.24% 1.24% 0.17%
3 5.05% 0.23% 1.00% 0.34%
4 5.12% 0.10% 2.42% 0.20%
Savings accounts 1.77% 0.15%
Bonds 4.10% 0.09% 2.76% 0.25%
Const. 0.61% 0.88%
No of obs 13,644 13,644
No of banks 2,672 2,672
R-sq Within 89.8% 90.4%
R-sq Between 78.5% 75.7%
R-sq Overall 81.5% 80.8%
Table 5: Estimated market-wide bank rates
Note: This table delivers results on the interest rates r1;t;:::;rJ;t for dierent types of borrowers and creditors,
maturities and degrees of liquidity, where the interest revenue (IR) and expenses (IE) are the dependent variables
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The coecients 1;t to J;t are equal to the respective average interest rates r1;t to rJ;t. "A
i;t and "L
i;t capture the
banks' idiosyncratic deviations and the bank-specic xed eects, and wi;j denotes the break down of the assets
and liabilities. We report the time-series averages of estimated bank rates for the 8 asset and 10 liability positions
and the average standard errors of the estimated coecients. Only banks not using derivatives in a given year are
included in the estimations.
24Banks w/o derivatives Banks with derivatives
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
Price changes (PCH)
All banks -0.041% 0.141% -0.042% 0.158%
1st size quartile -0.044% 0.143% -0.039% 0.150%
2nd size quartile -0.036% 0.143% -0.049% 0.149%
3rd size quartile -0.036% 0.139% -0.040% 0.159%
4th size quartile -0.049% 0.132% -0.040% 0.162%
Weight changes (WCH)
All banks 0.017% 0.126% 0.024% 0.121%
1st size quartile 0.018% 0.136% 0.012% 0.118%
2nd size quartile 0.012% 0.121% 0.011% 0.129%
3rd size quartile 0.013% 0.124% 0.017% 0.124%
4th size quartile 0.029% 0.115% 0.035% 0.116%
Table 6: Decomposition of the net interest margin
Note: This table delivers descriptive statistics of changes in the net interest margin due to prices and weights. Price
and weight changes are calculated according to Equations (5) and (6) with the rate estimates from Table 5. Size






Const 0.000 0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No of obs 18,728 18,728 18,728
R-sq 41.8% 34.5% 9.9%
Table 7: Impact of price and weight changes on the change in the margin
Note: This table delivers results on how changes in prices and weights impact on changes in net interest income.
The underlying model in column 1 looks like: nmi;t = 0 + 1  PCHi;t + 2  WCHi;t + "i;t. Robust standard
errors in brackets according to White (1980). *** denotes signicance at the 1% level.
25Size quartiles
All 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
PCH 0.891*** 0.886*** 0.885*** 0.899*** 0.921***
(0.012) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029)
PCH*DER -0.125*** 0.085 -0.028 -0.108*** -0.223***
(0.018) (0.061) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036)
WCH 0.509*** 0.519*** 0.527*** 0.548*** 0.357***
(0.016) (0.024) (0.035) (0.032) (0.043)
WCH*DER -0.091*** -0.197*** 0.010 -0.085* -0.002
(0.026) (0.086) (0.054) (0.049) (0.052)
Const 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No of obs 18,728 4,564 4,660 4,697 4,807
R-sq 42.1% 42.5% 43.8% 43.8% 39.1%
Table 8: Derivatives use and the change in the margin
Note: This table delivers results on how changes in prices and weights impact on changes in net interest income.
The underlying model looks like: nmi;t = 0 +1 PCHi;t +2 PCHi;t DERi;t +3 WCHi;t +4 WCHi;t 
DERi;t + "i;t. Robust standard errors in brackets according to White (1980). *** and * denote signicance at the
1% and the 10% level, respectively.
26Derivative quartiles
Non-users 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
PCH 0.894*** 0.856*** 0.852*** 0.770*** 0.633***
(0.012) (0.044) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028)
WCH 0.507*** 0.492*** 0.501*** 0.429*** 0.328***
(0.016) (0.039) (0.042) (0.037) (0.044)
Const 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No of obs 11,809 1,652 1,668 1,744 1,855
R-sq 43.0% 46.7% 45.2% 43.3% 32.3%
Table 9: Extent of derivatives use and change in the margin
Note: This table provides results on how changes in prices and weights impact on changes in net interest income.
The following model is estimated for ve subsamples classied on the extent of derivatives use: nmi;t = 0 + 1 
PCHi;t+2WCHi;t+"i;t. Robust standard errors in brackets according to White (1980). *** denotes signicance
at the 1% level.
Size quartiles
All 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
PCH 0.038*** 0.029* 0.051*** 0.035*** 0.052***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021)
PCH*DER 0.059*** 0.001 -0.024 0.036 0.091***
(0.013) (0.044) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025)
DER 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HEK 0.001*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No of obs 18707 4560 4660 4695 4792
R-sq 0.90% 0.25% 0.45% 0.67% 3.10%
Table 10: On-balance sheet weight changes
Note: This table displays results on how changes in prices (PCH) correlate with changes in weights (WCH). The
underlying model looks like: WCHi;t = 0 +1 DERi;t +2 PCHi;t +3 DERi;t PCHi;t +4 HEKi;t +"i;t.
Robust standard errors in brackets according to White (1980). *** and * denote signicance at the 1% and the
10% level, respectively.
27Size quartiles
All 1st, 2nd 3rd 4th
Weight change (WCH)
DERIV ATIV E 0.004*** 0.000 0.055 0.000
(0.001) (0.010) (0.252) (0.001)
PCH 0.099*** 0.039 0.279 0.143***
(0.013) (0.029) (1.098) (0.020)
HEK 0.001 -0.001 0.029 0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.139) (0.001)
NPL -0.014*** -0.017*** 0.049 -0.022***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.311) (0.005)
GROWTH -0.003*** -0.006 0.033 -0.007***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.186) (0.001)
Derivatives change (DERIV ATIV E)
WCH 122.4*** 113.9*** 97.6*** 105.1***
(12.4) (25.5) (20.2) (17.5)
PCH -15.542*** -5.813 -8.683** -25.839***
(2.43) (4.68) (4.30) (4.36)
HEK -0.309*** -0.230 -0.442* -0.329*
(0.118) (0.229) (0.252) (0.191)
NPL 1.360*** 2.188** 0.537 0.524
(0.492) (0.907) (1.101) (0.932)
log(SIZE) 0.010*** 0.008 -0.019 0.023***
(0.003) (0.013) (0.023) (0.006)
No of obs 4,775 1,074 1,207 2,092
Table 11: Simultaneous changes in weights and derivatives
Note: This table delivers results on weight and derivatives changes using 3SLS estimations for derivative users only.
The model looks like:
WCHi;t = 0 + 1  DERIV ATIV Ei;t + 2  PCHi;t + 3  HEKi;t + 4  NPLi;t + 5  GROWTHi;t + "i;t
DERIV ATIV Ei;t = 0 + 1  WHCi;t + 2  PCHi;t + 3  HEKi;t + 4  NPLi;t + 5  log(SIZEi;t) + i;t
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